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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY 
ETHICS CENTER 
FLETCHER 
AND CONOLLY 
DEBATE ACTIVE 
EUTHANASIA 
Joseph F. Fletcher, Visiting Profes-
sor of Medical Ethics at the University . 
of Virginia, explored the morality of 
active euthanasia with Matthew Con-
olly, Professor of Medicine and Phar-
'acology at UCLA, on April 8 at 
.Jma Linda. Fletcher argued that ac-
tive euthanasia is moral and should 
now be a legal option. Conolly took 
strong exception on both Christian 
and medical grounds. James Walters 
moderated the discussion as well as a 
Medicine and Society conference ear-
lier the same day at which Fletcher 
presented a lecture on the "Manage-
ment of Terminal Illness." 
Professor Fletcher, one of the first 
Protestant thinkers to explore the 
bioethical dilemmas of the modern 
age, published his pathfinding 
Medicine and Morals in 1954. A 
longtime professor of ethics at the 
Episcopal School of Theology in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Fletcher and 
his wife now divide their time between 
Charlottesville, Virginia and Anna 
Marie Island, Florida. Fletcher cele-
brated his eighty-second birthday 
while at Loma Linda. I 
Doctor Conolly received his medical 
training at Westminster Hospital, Lon-
don University. He now serves the 
UCLA Medical Center's Support Ser-
vices Team which cares for the termi-
';lly ill. In addition to a distinguished 
.edical career in England, Conolly 
served as Advisor to the House of 
Lords Committee Against Euthanasia 
in 1977. 
YODER ADDRESSES 
ETHICISTS AT LLU 
John Howard Yoder, Professor of 
Theology at the University of Notre 
Dame, delivered the presidential ad-
dress at a conference of the Pacific 
Section of the Society of Christian 
Ethics hosted by LLU on February 20. 
James Walters, the Ethics Center's 
Associate Director, was elected chair-
man of the association. Jerry McCar-
thy, an ethicist at St. John's Seminary, 
Los Angeles Diocese, was elected 
. program chair. 
In addition to Yoder's presentation, 
seven ethicists presented papers that 
covered the waterfront of Christian 
ethical concerns: Mark Kowalewski , 
USC, "A Pilgrim People: Toward a 
Processive-Dialogical Ethics in the 
Community of Faith;" Anthony Battag-
lia, CSU, Long Beach, "Sects or De-
nominations: Possibilities for Theology 
in a 'Post-Churchly' Situation;" Ver-
nard Eller, University of La Verne, 
"Another Big Try at Church and Sect;" 
Francis Colborn, Claremont Colleges, 
"Bernard Lonergan's Method and 
. Theological Ethics;" David Larson, 
The discussion of active voluntary 
euthanasia culminated a four-month 
series of Medicine and Society confer-
ences on the treatment of the se-
verely and terminally ill. Earlier ses-
sions dealt with "Do Not Resuscitate" 
orders, the foregoing of nutrition and 
hydration, and the factor of cost in 
million dollar cases. Video cassettes 
of the Fletcher and Conolly discussion 
as well as the earlier sessions may be 
purchased from the Media Services 
department of the Loma Linda Univer-
sity Library for $25 each. 
LLU, "Personhood's Priority in 
Biomedical Ethics;" Brent Waters, Uni-
versity of Redlands, "Star Wars and 
Just Wars;" and Paul Bube, USC, 
"Prayer and Social Ethics." 
Yoder argued that the Bible is a de-
cisive resource for contemporary so-
cial ethics. He cited five New T esta-
ment church practices, including bap-
tism and the breaking of bread, which 
exemplify social norms for contempo-
rary life. The practices are wholly 
human and empirically accessible as 
human actions, yet the Bible sees 
them as acts of God. "God is doing 
them in, with, and under the human 
practice. What is being done on earth 
is done in heaven," he stated. 
From Yoder's close study of early 
Christian practices, he concluded that 
(1) there is no fundamental distinction 
between genuine sacraments and ap-
propriate Christian social action, (2) 
the doctrine of redemption is just as 
important to social ethics as is the 
doctrine of creation, and (3) the "good 
news" has direct implications for the 
ordering of human life since these 
mandates are only generally realized 
through current notions of socialism, 
democracy and egalitarianism. 
Yoder's paper produced lively dis-
cussion. Some wondered if the prac-
tices cited by Yoder were grounded 
in - or were merely corroborated 
by - the realm of -redemption (or rev-
elation). Yoder refused to draw a 
dichotomy between the realm of re-
demption or revelation and that of cre-
ation or reason; rather he argued that 
too often the Biblical affirmations of 
egalitarian and communal practices 
.are ignored and undervalued. 
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THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS REGARDING AIDS 
Theology is thinking about the 
meaning of religious faith. Because 
religious faith is related to all of 
human existence or experience, so is 
theology. It is possible (and often use-
ful) to "think theologically" about all 
sorts of things - that is, to think 
about the meaning of religious faith 
for an understanding of nature, sci-
ence, medicine, education, sports, 
sex - whatever. 
In a Christian context, to think 
theologically about AIDS includes at 
least these three ideas: (1) AIDS is 
not God's will for anyone; (2) AIDS is 
an opportunity for Christian service; 
(3) AIDS is not the final word about 
the patient. Let me try to unpack 
these ideas very briefly. 
AIDS is not God's will for any-
one. It is not punishment for sin ("di-
vine retribution"). It is the result of a 
series of natural processes. Even if 
you regard intravenous drug abuse or 
homosexual activity as sinful, the fact 
remains that such activity is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for the occurrence of AIDS. 
It is a basic Christian conviction that 
the best clue to the character and ac-
tivity of God is Jesus of Nazareth. 
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When some friends of Jesus asked 
about a particular victim of disease, 
"Who sinned, this man or his par-
ents?" Jesus answered, "Neither" 
(John 9:2-3). The mistake made by 
Jesus' friends here was the assump-
tion of a direct, cause-and-effect con-
nection between one's moral choices 
and one's circumstances. Jesus 
pointed out that reality isn't that sim-
ple. 
In the case of AIDS, this kind of 
mistake is probably a response to 
(and rationalization of) two universal 
human problems. On the one hand, 
there is our personal fear and anxiety. 
AIDS represents two aspects of 
human reality that often make people 
rather uncomfortable: sexuality and 
death. (This anxiety, by the way, 
seems to be as typical of physicians, 
nurses, and hospital chaplains as it is 
of the rest of humanity.) 
On the other hand, there is human 
pride or self-righteousness, which has 
a convenient hierarchy of vices. Some 
sins, especially sexual ones, are often 
considered disreputable, while others, 
especially attitudinal ones, don't even 
count. According to Jesus, the truth of 
the matter is quite different: for the 
blatantly unrighteous there is the pos-
sibility of acceptance and forgiveness 
and an eternal future; but for the 
smugly self-righteous there is no fu-
ture at all. 
AIDS is an opportunity for ser-
vice. Both its terror and its hopeless-
ness give it a special claim on Chris-
tian attention and concern. 
Jesus of Nazareth is not only our 
best clue to the character and activity 
of God; he is also our best clue to the 
meaning and fulfillment of human-
ness. In what he said and what he 
was we see what it means to be truly 
human. He said, for example, "Do for 
others what you would want them to 
do for you" (Matthew 7:12). And when 
he met the victims of leprosy (which 
was for his time and place what AIDS 
is for us), he listened to them, talked 
to them, touched them, healed them 
(e.g., Mark 1:40-45; Luke 17:11-19). 
When he was criticized for being too 
friendly with disreputable persons he 
said that the reason he cared about 
them was that God cared about them 
(Luke 15). 
Jesus made it clear that humanness 
is fulfilled in giVing, serving, helping. 
When he was talking about the ulti-
mate meaning of human existence, he 
described a scene in which the King 
of all reality said to some people, "I 
was sick and you looked after me," 
and to others, "I was sick and you 
didn't look after me" (Matthew 
25:36,43). To take the religion of 
Jesus seriously is to respond to 
human need. 
The kind of service Jesus was talk-
ing about has two important charac-
teristics. It is done without regard to 
the "worth" of those served: he 
washed the feet of Judas. And it was 
done without regard to self-interest: 
he was most interested in people who 
couldn't possibly return the favor. 
This, of course, is what God is and 
does: he gives himself for the benefit 
of the unworthy. This is the meaning 
of agape; this is the "good news." 
And this is the kind of opportunity 
we have in relation to patients with 
AIDS. They can never pay us back. 
They will not become producti 
members of society. They will not dl. 
nate a small fortune to fund medical 
research; they often will not even pay 
their own medical bills. Those who are 
not already Christian will probably not 
be converted. But they are all sick, 
and they need to be cared for. And 
that is what matters. 
There are many ways to care. One 
possibility is personal interaction: in-
vesting time and interest, being pre-
sent and listening. Another possibility 
is the establishment of structures of 
care - such as volunteer organiza-
tions to make sure that patients are 
cared for, and hospices like the one 
established by Mother Theresa in 
New York. 
Still another possibility is influencing 
public policy to address the public 
need. There needs to be massive 
public funding, not only for research 
but also for care, as the number of 
cases increases and the costs soar 
into billions of dollars. And there 
needs to be broad AIDS education in 
public and private schools and in the 
various information media. Such 
things are more likely to happen 
there is vigorous and persistent cor .. 
munication with legislators and other 
public officials, and if there is discus-
(continued on page 8) 
NURSES AND 'NO CODE' ORDERS 
Donna J. Fritz, R. N. 
Nursing Staff Development 
Lama Linda University Medical Center 
Are "No Code" orders moral? Of course they are! The 
absence of "no code" orders on specific patients is im-
moral. Four major issues are especially important to 
nurses: (1) patient autonomy, (2) the role conflict of the 
nurse, (3) decision-making, and (4) family education. 
Patient autonomy. Nurses place a high value on the 
ethical principle of patient autonomy. This principle was 
also supported by the President's Commission on 
Bioethics, which recommended that treatment decisions 
should be discussed with a competent patient or the in-
competent patient's surrogate. 
DNR decisions should be based on the moral values of 
the patient, preferences concerning the meaning, sanctity, 
d quality of life from the patient's own point of view. Are 
the patient's present choices consonant with his or her na-
ture as a person? 
"Decisions should be based upon the 
moral values of the patient, preferences 
from the patient's own point of view." 
Role Conflict. Role conflict is the greatest source of 
stress for the nurse who is caught in an ethical web. The 
nurse is responsible to three different entities. The nurses' 
primary responsibility is to the patient; nurses act as pa-
tient advocates within their responsibilities as the most visi-
ble and constant care-givers during hospitalization. But the 
nurse is also responsible to protect the interests of the 
hospital and to carry out the orders of medical therapy. 
The nurse contends with these three sometimes competing 
interests, but she or he must also act according to her or 
his own ethical principles in each situation. 
How can the nurse's integrity b~ preserved when the 
wishes of a patient or family regar8ing a DNR response 
are in direct conflict with the physician's orders or how can 
the nurse ethically justify disregarding the family's or pa-
tient's wishes in order to carry out hospital policy? What is 
the nurse's obligation when a morally wrong decision is 
\ade by someone else and the nurse is expected to im-
r-I(ement the orders resulting from that decision? How can 
the institution provide "moral space" for nurses? 
Decision-making. Health professionals, including 
nurses, do not usually have enough training in making 
ethical decisions. We feel that there are no right answers. 
We empathize and agonize with our physician colleagues 
over ethical decisions. Many discussions about whether it 
is time to write a DNR order for a specific patient are in-
itiated by nurses. To postpone the decision or to make no 
decision is a decision to "code" the patient. 
Yale-New Haven Hospital documented six communica-
tion problems related to DNR orders. Two of these are 
that: (1) Some members of the health-care team who have 
important information may not share it because they are 
unaware that a decision is to be made or because they are 
fearful that they may be viewed as overstepping their 
bounds. (2) Discussion with the patient is initiated much 
too late, so late that the patient may be incompetent. 
A DNR order is a team decision. "None of us is as smart 
as all of us." There should be interdisciplinary discussion-
of the patient's status and goals. Each one on the team 
must understand the reason for writing or not writing the 
DNR order. It is important that the nurse be present when 
the DNR discussion takes place with the family. The nurse 
can then reinforce aspects of the discussion and can an-
swer the questions of the patient or family based on the 
specifics of the discussion. 
Members of the health team should talk with the patient 
or family before the patient is taking the last breath. Noth-
ing is more stressful for the nurse than waiting "momentar-
ily" for a decision to be made as the patient's blood pres-
sure and respiration decline. 
Nurses care for patients on a sustained basis, attending 
to basic intimate, physical and emotional needs. Because 
of proximity, the nurse may be the one with whom the pa-
tient chooses to discuss the matter. 
Physicians should document in the progress notes the 
discussion with the family or patient and then record the 
"How can the institution provide 'moral 
space' for nurses?" 
specific DNR order. Unfortunate errors of commission and 
omission have been made in implementing DNR orders 
because of paperwork blunders. 
Family Education. Do families really understand the 
terminology we use in discussing the patient's condition? 
3 
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Do they know what the "everything" means in "do every-
thing you possible can?" Some families have been sur-
prised by the presence of an endotracheal tube and a ven-
tilator because they did not realize that this was part of the 
bargain in saying "everything." 
Families need to understand that "no code" does not 
mean "no care." Although some treatments will be discon-
tinued, the family needs to understand that we will vigor-
ously pursue the goals of comfort and dignity for the pa-
tient and that we will make support of the family a high 
priority. Under these circumstances nursing care is inten-
sified. The family responds best to nursing behavior di-
rected toward patient comfort and the provision of informa-
tion regarding the patient's condition. 
In summary, patient autonomy should be a primary con-
sideration in making the decision about the DNR order. 
The nurse has valuable information about the patient's 
view of what it means to be sick. Because of her or his 
proximity to the patient, the nurse plays a key role in aid-
ing decision-making. and family education. 
WHAT IS A 'NO CODE' ORDER? 
Richard L. Sheldon, M.D. 
Associate Professor of Medicine 
Loma Linda University 
"No code" orders are implemented in intensive-care set-
tings by use of the term "do not resuscitate" or DNR. Many 
feel that this term is so inaccurate as to destroy the entire 
concept. "Do not resuscitate" sometimes wrongly implies 
withholding food and water, placing the patient "out behind 
the barn" or "leaving the litter along the trail" as the rest 
press on. In fact, all patients coming to the hospital are re-
suscitated - given air, either ambient or enriched, plus 
food and water. The real question is, should we give 
emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation or emergency 
CPR? Some sl:lggest that we should replace the term "do 
not resuscitate" with "no emergency CPR." 
The great ethical dilemmas in medicine, such as those 
surrounding "no code" orders, center around establishing a 
balance among the demands of (1) justice, (2) benefi-
cence, and (3) autonomy. 
"Families need to understand that 'no 
code' does not mean 'no care.'" 
To establish an ethical balance among these three areas 
is difficult and challenging. To comRlicate matters, the bal-
ance should be achieved in a settinZg where adequate dis-
cussion and reason are available. Unfortunately, intensive-
care units are filled with patients, families, and staff who 
may be anxious, angry, disappointed, fearful, and guilt-
laden. To find the right atmosphere in which to make "no 
code" decisions requires an active commitment on the part 
of everyone involved. 
Balance must be achieved to serve the demands of jus-
tice, beneficence, and autonomy. However, other issues 
also demand consideration: the demands of science, law, 
cost containment, public relations, accurate record-keePr 
ing, and many more. 
Nevertheless, if a hospital and its staff can deliver high-
quality medical care in a setting of justice, beneficence, 
and autonomy for each patient, that hospital and staff will 
achieve a standing of inestimable value. 
LET'S REPLACE 
"DO NOT RESUSCITATE" 
WITH "CARE FOR THE DYING" 
Kenneth G. Jordan, M.D., F.A.C.P. 
Assistant Professor of Neurology 
Loma Linda University 
It is fitting and proper for medicine to establish 
guidelines to address hopelessly ill patients. Our humani-
tarian instincts dictate that irreversibly and irreparably ill 
persons facing imminent death or a vegetative existence 
should not be subjected to "advanced life support and 
maximal therapeutic efforts," which at best will forestall the 
inevitable, and at worst increase morbidity. (1,2,3) Experi-
ence has shown that these patients, even if they are suc-
cessfully resuscitafed, do not survive their hospital stay. 
(4,5) Economic constraints have emphasized the high cost 
of intensive life support, and a litigious climate makes a 
sanctioned hospital protocol desirable. The question is, 
what policy should guide us? 
"Nothing is more stressful for the nurse 
than waiting for a decision to be made as 
the patient's blood pressure and respira-
tion decline." 
Closely examined, most current DNR policies fail the 
test of logic. They do not work well and do not serve the 
needs of dying patients. They are illogical because there 
are no characteristics inherent to CPR which qualify it to 
be the centerpiece of a medical policy towards the dying. 
Other interventions may be equally, if less immediately, re-
quired to reverse catastrophe and prevent death: chest 
tubes, transfusions, antibiotics, antiarrhythmics, cardiac 
pacemakers, and emergency surgery. Setting aside its 
urgency and drama, CPR is no different in principle from 
many other methods we use to preserve and prolong life. 
Even monitoring a patient's electrocardiogram or checking 
his blood gases, electrolytes and blood counts, serve the 
same purpose in th_eir mundane way. While sometimes 
considered "heroic," CPR today is a rather ordinary proce-
dure which in its basic form is taught to camp counselors, 
boy scouts, teachers and taxi drivers. Unfortunately, mos~ 
DNR policies have elevated the status of CPR so that it 
dominates their philosophies and is considered the 
touchstone of .our interaction with dying patients. 
Much confusion and inconsistency have been created in 
~e process. A recent article stressed the widely-held view 
\at "DNR orders do not and should not be interpreted to 
imply any other change in the level of medical or nursing 
care." (1) This dictum reverberates among most hospital 
policies. (6,7,8) Yet, what is the logic with a hopeless, 
dying patient, of withholding CPR on humanitarian grounds 
but intervening in other ways for "reversible conditions" 
which will prolong his dying? I am not referring to with-
drawing ongoing treatment, pain control, water or nutrition. 
But, to the extent a physician is willing to judge his patient 
as irreparably and irreversibly ill facing imminent death or 
a vegetative existence, then all additional interventions, not 
only CPR, become useless and even intrusive. To the ex-
tent that a physiCian decides additional interventions are 
not useless, he has implicitly judged his patient as not ir-
reparably and hopelessly ill, and it is arbitrary to withhold 
CPR alone. 
"Some physicians fear that DNR status 
will expose their patients to less thorough 
care." 
We have all experienced this arbitrariness. Among 72 
DNR patients, Evans and Brody found no consistent pat-
tern in the range or kind of other interventions ordered-
6% received "all interventions except resuscitation," 50% 
-"\ceived "some medical interventions for reversible condi-
Jns," and 36% received "no additional interventions." (9) 
Uhlmann and colleagues reported that 43% of DNR orders 
were ambiguous about further treatment limitation plans. 
(8) They noted that cross-covering physicians were uncer-
tain how to interpret the intent of DNR orders toward trans-
fusions, antibiotics, antiarrhythmics, and admission to the 
intensive-care ' unit. Highlighting confusion in this area, a 
recent editorial tried to "clarify" DNR policy by changing the 
name of the order to "No Emergency CPR," causing us to 
wonder who gets "non-emergency CPR?" (7) It is unlikely 
that simple name changes will add clarity. 
"CFD would stress providing a new level 
of care and attention to the dying pa-
tient." 
Criteria for DNR orders are vague. A recent study found 
that 38% of patients declared DNR did not arrest and left 
the hospital alive. (11) I<yff, et al., reported an 11 % survival 
rate for patients who received CPR in the hospital and a 
16% survival rate for ICU patients ' tonsidered DNA. (12) 
Residents, attending physiCians, and community practition-
ers were found to differ significantly in their DNR deci-
sions. Residents more often favored withholding support 
than practitioners, with attendings holding an intermediate 
"')sition. These physicians varied greatly in assessing the 
_..eversibility of a patient's illness and in their perceptions of 
a patient's quality of life. (13) Lo and Steinbrook stressed 
that some patients who accepted DNR status before a 
crisis changed their minds in the face of rapid deteriora-
tion. (16) These data raise disturbing questions about the 
accuracy and objectivity of DNR decisions. 
Moreover, our DNR policies are not achieving what 
many see as their most important goal, to insure that phy-
sicians consult early with patients and families in order to 
allow them "autonomy of judgment." (14) Studies show that 
this occurs with disappointing rarity. Bedell and others 
found that of 389 patients subsequently placed on DNR 
status, only 11 % had an abnormal mental status on admis-
"Each one on the team must understand 
the reasons for writing or not writing the 
DNR order." 
sion. However, before the decision to write a DNR order 
was made, 76% had become confused or comatose, ex-
cluding them from involvement. (11) Uhlmann, et al. , re-
ported that among patients declared DNR at the Portland 
VA Medical Center, only 43% were involved in the deci-
sion. (10) More striking was Evans and Brody's finding that 
only 26% of DNR patients were consulted by physicians. 
(9) Thus the practice of DNR policies is at variance with 
their ethical goal of prior consultation with patients. 
When physicians do discuss this sensitive issue, they 
vary greatly in their styles, vocabulary and demonstrations 
of empathy. Miller and Lo reported marked differences in 
the ways physicians described CPR and its possible out-
comes. (15) Some physicians avoid describing CPR, feel-
ing it would cause the patient "too much worry." Others 
hesitated to recommend a course of action, fearing to im-
pose their wishes on patients even when guidance was re-
quested. A simulation study found the physicians' personal 
assumptions and values, often unconsciously conveyed, in-
fluenced the patient's choice. (15) 
In medicine we are at our best when guided by reason 
and compassion. Most DNR policies address the broad 
needs of dying and hospitalized patients with little explicit 
compassion. (3) This omission, perhaps stylistic, sends a 
regrettable message. Thus, while DNR policies mention the 
importance of providing continued comfort and support, in 
reality, patients on DNR status are frequently cast in a les-
ser role. An informal survey of house staff by Donnelly 
found that, to them, DNR was equated with "no hope," "no 
"The great ethical dilemmas in medicine 
center around establishing a balance 
among the demands of justice, benefici-
enee, and autonomy." 
care," "do nothing," and "do not treat." Some physicians 
fear that DNR status will expose their patients to less thor-
ough care by nurses and cross-covering physicians. (7) I 
believe these prejudices arise from the emphasis of DNR 
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policies on sparing the dying patient intervention, instead 
of intervening to ease his passage. DNR policies, as re-
flected in their name and by virtue of their focus, stress the 
withholding of care from individuals at a point in their lives 
when, even more than death, they fear abandonment and 
loneliness. 
It is my view that instead of a "Do Not Resuscitate" pol-
icy, we need to "Care for the Dying" (CFD). A CFD policy 
would acknowledge the logical and consistent view that 
once a patient has entered the process of dying or a veg-
etative existence, all additional interventions to prolong life, 
be they heroic or mundane, should properly be withheld. 
This would include CPR, antibiotics, antiarrhythmics, trans-
fusions, intensive care and surgery. These patients should 
also be spared the pain of venipuncture and arterial blood 
gas determinations, as well as the unnecessary discomfort 
of radiological procedures and frequent awakenings for 
vital signs. At the same time, CFD would stress providing 
a new level of care and attention to the dying patient. Suf-
ficiently potent and frequent doses of pain relievers could 
be given without 'ambivalence. Visiting hour limitations 
could be suspended. Family members in emotional dis-
"Intensive-care units are filled with pa-
tients, families, and staff who may be anx-
ious, angry, disappointed, fearful, and 
guilt-laden." 
tress could be provided with trained support. Children 
could be encouraged, with guidance, to say good-bye to 
their loved ones. Remote family members could be con-
tacted and assisted in paying one last visit. Religious 
needs and involvement of the patient's clergyman would 
be emphasized. Rounds could be used to the staff's bene-
fit by discussing the specific emotional and ethical issues 
the patient's treatment raises. The medical and nursing 
team would see their roles as positive ones, of providing 
care, comfort and company to the patient and his family. 
This shift in attitude would do much to prevent the de-
"Most current DNR policies fail the test of 
logic. They do not work well and do not 
serve the needs of dying patients." 
moralizing negation which at times repels us from the 
dying patient's bedside. 
CFD could address other needs of hospitalized, dying 
patients and their physicians. Not all patients need to or 
should die in the hospital. There isrnuch to be said for al-
lowing a person to die among th~ comforting familiarity 
and memories of his own home. Physicians may feel un-
certain or uncomfortable about judging certain patients 
hopelessly ill. They may desire and should receive assist-
ance from medical, religious or bioethical conSUltants. A 
CFD Committee could be helpful to monitor the application 
of hospital policy towards the hopelessly ill. 
In my opinion, a policy to Care for the Dying would be 
intuitively more satisfying for members of the medical team 
and for patients. It would allow us to face our patients and 
their families early and speak to them without apology 
about withholding unnecessary interventions, because we 
would offer them at the same time a supportive and posi-
tive approach to ease their passage. It would remove the 
burden of trying to reconcile the artificial distinction be-
tween CPR and other interventions. By being more logical, 
a CFD policy would be more consistently implemented. By 
being explicitly compassionate, it would be more emotion-
ally acceptable to physicians and nurses who would be 
able to see themselves as providing for, not just withhold-
ing from, their patients. Hopefully, while achieving these 
goals, it would also encourage us to remember - perhaps 
with regret, but certainly without shame - that even in 
this advanced technological wonderland of modern 
medicine, we can cure all too rarely and treat only some-
times. Yet, we can comfort always. 
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The Pandora's Box of Human Lijt~ 
Society's Issue: Is Biology or Personality the Essential Ingredient? 
By JAMES W. WALTERS 
The Vaticart has opened a Pandora's box 
that won't be closed until society answers 
a fundamental . question: Is biology or 
personality the essential ingredient of 
valuable human life? Rome 8ay~ biology. 
Society increasingly says personality. 
The question is not new, but the debate is 
ratcheted up .several notchel! by the pro-
mulgation of the Roman Catholic Church's 
statement of doctrine, "Respect for Human 
Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity of 
Procreation. " 
The biological model holds that every 
manifestatiOn of Homo sapiens is of intrinsic 
worth. Therefore the Vatican !!peaks of 
the embryo as "the unborn child" who 
"must be cared for~ to the extent possible, 
in the same way as any other human being 
as far as medical assistance is concerned." 
The Vatican is unflinchingly consistent 
in reasoning that theetpbryo · "must be 
treated as a person." Even in~vitro fer-
tilization, which utilizes the husband's 
!!perm, is banned because, among other 
objections, unused embryos might be used 
for experimentation or destroyed outright. 
The incapacity of one out of five couples to 
procreate is lamented but is no excuse for 
sinning against the natural, hence moral, 
method of human reproduction. 
The personality model argues that the 
essence of being human is not genetic 
composition but uniquely personal capaci-
ties-for example, the capacity for rational 
creativity. Thus the more artificially pro-
creation is done, the more "human" it is 
because it involves personal creativity. 
The personality. model draws a funda-
mental distinction between mere human 
being and valuable personal being. All 
humans are not personal, and all persons 
are not human. Individuals in a permanent 
coma are undeniably human, but queStion-
ably personal; "ET" is an engaging little 
person, but surely is not human. 
Persons are defined as individuals who 
are capable · of self-awareness, rational 
choice, loving and being loved. An embryo 
does not possess these capacities; neither 
does a fetus, nor for that matter a new-
born. Those who advocate personhood 
criteria for determining valuable life 
are liberal regarding abortion and non-
treatment of severely handicapped new-
borns; however, they are the first to 
contend for animal liberation-particularly 
the right to life of dolphins, whales and 
primates. 
Neither position takes its case to a 
logical, if extreme, conclusion. The Vati-
can gives weight to humanhood, but it 
does not conclude that medical science 
should attempt to arrest the high rate 
(over 50'%) of spontaneous · abortions of 
embryos, and thus potentially save millions 
of lives. Philosopher Michael Tooley, a 
leading advocate of personhood, argues 
that infanticide is intrinsically moral but, 
because of untoward social consequences, 
unwise. 
The question is not one of absolute 
rightness, but of weighting. And such 
weighting in a democracy is determined 
by neither Pope nor philosopher, but by a 
people's collective experiencing of and 
thinking about human life. The church is 
to be praised for putting a long-simmering 
discussion on the front . burner. Indeed, 
legislation is needed to keep technology in 
place, but the contours of the legislation 
must emerge lrom public discussion: 
An appropriate social policy in a plural-
istic, non-sectarian state is neither a 
thoroughSoing· biolpgica1 nor a personal 
model of a human being, but a reasonable 
compromise .. A basic reasonableness sug-
gests two important standards determin-
ing the value of early human life: poten-
tiality and proximity -derived from the 
biological and per.sonal models, respec.., 
tively. 
Potentiality suggests that the human 
conceptus is not just any tissue, bitt is 
uniquely endowed with the potential of 
attaining full human status .if nature takes 
its normal course. In one sense all humans 
are merely potential persons, for no one 
has achieved his or her ideal potential; 
Ute embryo is merely the weakest of the 
weak. As such, it could be argued thilt 
the conceptus deserves the protection of 
law, just as the law now protects other 
classes that have faced discrimination 
at the hands of the strong-slaves, foreign-
ers, blacks, women. The civility of a society 
may be determined by the manner in which 
it treats its most vulnerable members. 
(The norm in Western countries that are 
involved in embryo research is tolirntt 
invasive procedures to subjects fewer than 
14 days old. ) 
Proximity means that the embryo-fetus 
is a person in the process of becoming, and 
the greater the approximation of person-
hood, the greater its value. Proximity 
grants the potential of the newly fertilized 
single-cell zygote but distinguishes be-
tween its value and the value of a mature 
human person. The difference is so signifi-
cant that most reasonable persons do not 
believe that the right of a conceptus to life 
is as weighty as the right of a woman -to 
take a morning-afterpW. 
The Supreme Court's Roe vs. Wade de-
cision used approximation-of-personhood 
reasoning in.dividing human gestatiqil into 
trimesters. DurIng the fU'St trimester a 
woman has free choice without the poBlIi-
bUity of state regulation; in the subsequent 
trimesters the state may sequentially rew-
late and then ban abortion. 
Approximation-ol-personhood now alSo 
applies at the other edge or life. A yt!ar. 
ago this month the judicial council of the 
American Medi~ Assn. ruled that phy-
sietans could ethicany withdraw all artifi-
cial life · support, including nutrition and 
hydration, from patients who -were in 
comas reasonably determined to be per-
manent. These individuals are fully alive 
human beings in that their brain stems 
are intact and sustaining Circulation and 
respiration. But' because their personal 
capacities for self-awareness and rational-
ity are irretrievably lost, they no longer 
possess a Unique claim to continued exist-
ence. 
Coma cases are the opposite of embryos. 
With coma patients, proximity is great but 
potentiality is nil. With embryos, proximity 
is small but potentiality is great. In both 
cases many persons will ethically justify 
termination of support because the human 
subjects are so distant, in either potentiality 
or proximity, from personhood. 
This balance, or conflict, will be crucial 
in sorting out the numerous conundrums 
that await us in the Pandora's box of policy 
decisions affecting human life. 
James W. WaUers is an associate professor 
of Christian ethics at Lorna Linda University 
and the chairman of the Pacific section of the 
Society of Christian Ethics. 
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A IDS (continued from page 2) 
sion in public forums like letters to 
editors and talk shows. We can let 
people know that AIDS patients must 
be cared for, even if it means - as it 
surety will - less money for ourselves 
because of higher taxes and insur-
ance premiums. 
AIDS is not the final word 
about a patient. It is a terrible, tragic 
word, but it is not the last word. Jesus 
of Nazareth is the best clue to the 
meaning of human existence and 
everything it contains. For him, suffer-
ing and death were not the last word. 
The last word was victory over suffer-
ing and death. 
As of now, AIDS is absolutely fatal. 
But the patient as a person can be 
healed in the · way that matters most 
(I do not say this gJibly, but very delib-
erately). Typically the patient feels 
abandoned by family and friends. If 
the patient is homosexual, he already 
feels rejected by society in general. 
And this feeUng may be internalized 
as guilt - riot only because of what 
he does, but because of what he is. In 
this abandonment and guilt, there is 
no good medical news - no prospect 
of a cure, not even any hope of a 
miracle. Despair is eminently under-
standable. 
But there is the possibility of love 
and acceptance, mediated by persons 
who are willing to care. This is even 
more important than extending the pa-
tient's life. And for this we will need 
people. We will need personnel for 
whom caring is not only a professional 
function but also a personal ministry. 
We will also need an army of volun-
teers who will invest themselves in 
terms of their presence. 
For a Christian health-care commu-
nity AIDS is a challenge to live its 
theology. 
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COWART, CAMPBELL, 
PROVONSHA ASSESS 
"ETHICS AT LIFE'S END" 
Dax Cowart, Ross Campbell, and 
Jack Provonsha were the principal 
speakers at "Ethics at Life's End," a 
seminar the Ethics Center presented 
on March 9 at LLU's 55th Annual 
Postgraduate Convention. About 125 
physicians, nurses, and other profes-
sionals participated in the day's ac-
tivities. 
The seminar began with the presen-
tation of "Please Let Me Die," a filmed 
interview of Dax Cowart several 
months following a 1973 automobile 
accident that left him blind and se-
verely burned. During the interview, 
Mr. Cowart repeatedly and thought-
fully requested that his treatments be 
terminated so that his life could end. 
When questioned at the LLU confer-
ence, Cowart reasserted his belief 
that his therapy should have been dis-
continued even though he has been 
able to complete college and law 
school, pass the Texas bar, and es-
tablish a law practice since his acci-
dent. 
Ross Campbell, a health-care attor-
ney with Musick, Peeler, and Garrett 
in the San Francisco Bay area., de-
tailed the expectations of current 
California law as available in recent 
statutes as well as in the Barber, 
Bouvia, and Bartling cases. He em-
phasized the usefulness of durable 
powers of attorney for specifying leg-
ally authorized decision-makers in dif-
ficult cases. 
Jack Provonsha, a physiCian and 
ethicist who serves as chairman of the 
Ethics Center's Board of Directors, 
discussed the issues of the day from 
the perspective of Christian moral 
thought. He distinguished several 
forms of death (mind, brain, organ, 
cellular) and argued that modern tech-
nological resources require one to 
focus upon the death of the mind 
even as the body is respected for its 
symbolic value. Provonsha also em-
phasized the priority of a competent 
patient's free and informed decision. 
PAPERS SOLICITED 
FOR THE 1988 
ABORTION CONFERENCE 
Scholarly papers from a variety of 
perspectives and professions are so-
licited for the Ethics Center's 1988 
conference on "Abortion and Advent-
ism Today." These papers will be pre-
sented at the conference, revised at 
their authors' discretion in light ot 
questions and criticisms, and pub· 
lished in an anthology that reveals 
current Adventist thought. This collec-
tion of essays will enable Adventist in-
dividuals and institutions to formulate 
their own conclusions regarding abor-
tion with awareness of what their col-
leagues are thinking. 
Papers may be either descriptive or 
prescriptive. Descriptive studies will 
analyze the denomination's past and 
present attitudes. Prescriptive essays 
will defend recommendations regard-
ing abortion in Adventist families, in-
stitutions and political efforts. 
Any person with a point of view re-
garding abortion in Seventh-day Ad-
ventist thought and life who is inter-
ested in presenting a paper at the 
conference is invited to contact David 
Larson at the Ethics Center as soon 
as possible. 
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